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Abstract  –  The  paper  analyzes  competition  among 
supermarkets in Brazil. In contrast to part of the economic 
literature  which  suggests  that  the  fast  growth  of  big 
supermarket  chains  would  destroy  independent,  medium 
and  small  supermarkets,  the  paper  argues  that  big 
supermarket  chains  can  coexist  with  different  formats  of 
independent food retailing. As a result, competition in food 
retail  is  complex  and  cannot  be  described  as  a  simple 
Darwinian process of market concentration. The analysis is 
divided  in  two  parts.  In  the  first  part,  the  competition 
between  hypermarkets  and  supermarkets  is  examined. 
Evidences for the district of Sao Paulo, Brazil, suggest that 
these  retailers  form  separate  markets.  The  second  part  is 
focused on neighborhood supermarkets. The  results differ 
from  the  general  belief  that  independent  supermarkets 
establish  higher  prices  in  comparison  to  big  chain 
supermarkets. The analysis brings to light the heterogeneity 
of the competitive fringe in the oligopoly model of Brazilian 
retailing. 
 





Recent literature on supermarkets has emphasized the 
rapid concentration of food retailing (Reardon, 2004.), the 
increasing buyer power of supermarket  chains (Dobson 
and  Waterson,  1999),  and  the  adoption  of  private 
standards  (Reardon,  2004;  Reardon,  Timmer  and 
Berguedé, 2003). The results from this literature seem too 
linear. The rise of big supermarkets increases their buyer 
power, allowing them to impose prices and standards on 
the supply chain, from food processors to farmers. Private 
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standards are complex and costly to accomplish and the 
result is the exclusion of small food businesses (retailers, 
processors and farmers), leading to a general process of 
concentration. 
The present paper states that the consequences of the 
aforementioned process are complex and can result in the 
preservation  of  the  main  characteristic  of  the  less 
developed countries, i.e. huge heterogeneity
1. The main 
flaw  of  most  papers  resides  in  the  assumption  that 
supermarket means big chains. Few discussions are made 
regarding the variety of food retailers’ formats. 
D’Andrea  et  al.  (2006:661),  for  instance,  state  that: 
“[a]fter  a  decade  of  sustained  growth  of  the  ‘modern’ 
retail sector in Latin America, smaller scale retailers still 
supply  a  significant  portion  of  fast-moving  consumer 
goods to the ‘emerging’ consumer base or low income 
segments”.  Farina,  Nunes  and  Monteiro  (2005a)  argue 
through a theoretical model and empirical evidences for 
Brazil that the survival of traditional retailing occurs not 
only in sophisticated niches (Reardon, 2004) but also in 
ordinary  food  products  in  the  poor  regions  of  the 
metropolitan areas. Even for developed countries, Chen 
(2003) argues that an important retail trend in the past 
few  decades  has  been  the  polarization  of  store  size. 
Increasingly, mid-sized general merchandise retailers are 
squeezed out by large-scale retailers and small specialty 
stores (Chen, 2003:613).  
This paper explores the coexistence of different kinds 
of food retailers in Brazil. The main propositions are: (a) 
the price mechanism of retailers are intricate and may be 
influenced by a number of different forces; (b) the general 
category supermarket masks the complexity of food retail 
competition;  and  (c)  despite  the  general  believe  that 
                                                 
1 It is worth emphasizing that Reardon (2004) does not ignore 
these aspects, but he chooses to favor the supermarket side of 
the equation due to the necessity to define an analytical frontier.   2 
independent  supermarkets  are  less  efficient  than  big 
chains,  the  average  price  of  a  representative  basket  of 
food products at independent stores has been lower than 
the average price of chain stores. 
The paper is organized as follows: 1. Introduction; 2. 
An overview of the Brazilian food retailing sector; 3. An 
analysis  of  small  retailing  survival;  4.  A  conceptual 
model of competition in food retail; 5. Price Competition; 
6. Conclusions and questions for further research. 
 
II.  FOOD RETAIL STRUCTURE IN BRAZIL 
 
The 90’s were characterized by the fast transformation 
of Brazilian supermarket sector. The control of inflation 
along  with  trade  liberalization  attracted  new  foreign 
companies  to  the  national  market.  On  the  other  hand, 
economic stabilization also stimulated the expansion of 
big national supermarket chains. As a result, the number 
of  supermarkets’  stores  operating  in  the  country 
experienced substantial growth (Dall´Agnese, 2007).  
 
Graph 1: Number of Supermarkets’ stores – Brazil, 1990/2006 
(1000 stores). 
 
Source: DALL´AGNESE (2007).  
 
The  process  of  companies’  concentration  has  also 
intensified.  There  were  89  M&A  operations  in  the 
Brazilian supermarket sector from January 1995 to April 
2007.  The  Herfindahl-Hirschman  Index  has  risen  from 
532 in 1995 to 1052 in 2005; the CR5 has risen from 38 
% to 64 % during the same period (table 1). 
 
Table 1: Degree of Concentration: Supermarket Sector – 
Brazil, 1994 – 2002. 
 
Year  HHI (300 biggest companies)  CR5(%) 
1995  532,21  38 
1996  455,8  39 
1997  471,69  41 
1998  663,14  47 
1999  957,68  60 
2000  1033,59  62 
2001  971,74  60 
2002  1005,48  59 
2003  1161,00  58 
2004  1107,00  62 
2005  1052,00  64 
Source: ABRAS – The Brazilian Supermarket Association 
Yet,  the  concentration  process  did  not  represent  the 
disappearance of small and medium retail. As economic 
stabilization stimulated an increase in frequency of food 
purchase, consumer’s concern regarding the convenience 
of the purchase has become more important, allowing the 
survival of smaller neighborhood stores (Farina & Nunes, 
2002).  
Generally,  the  number  of  stores  belonging  to 
supermarket chains increased 4.29% between 1994 and 
2006. In the same period, the number of traditional stores 
grew  47%,  or  3.97%  per  year  and  the  number  of 
independent supermarkets grew 90%, or 7.57% per year 
(table  2).    In  the  same  period,  the  GNP  grew  16.4%, 
equivalent  to  2.6%  per  year.  It  is  worth  noting  that 
regional  analysis  shows  significant  distinctions.  The 
expansion of supermarket chains has been more intense in 
the densely populated metropolitan region of Sao Paulo 
and in States of higher income
2. 
With regard to food sales in recent years (2001-2006), 
supermarket  chains  present  positive  rates  of  expansion. 
On  the  other  hand,  independent  supermarkets  and 
traditional  stores  have  negative  rates  indicating  a 
reduction  in  its  share  of  food  sales.  The  exception  is 
metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro: the relative weight 
of the chains in food sales has reduced (-3.13%) and the 
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region).   3 
weight  of  independent  supermarkets  has  advanced 
(18.86%). 
Table 2: Variation – number of stores and share of food sales 
(1994-2006) 
 
Variation (% per year) 
Number of stores  Food sales 
AC Nielsen 
Regions  Type of store 
(1994-2006)  (2001-2006) 
Chain  4,29  2,52 








Traditional  3,97  -3,33 
Chain  3,13  4,48 










Traditional  5  -4,32 
Chain  6,47  4,98 











Traditional  4,1  -2,6 
Chain  4,05  -3,13 












Traditional  7,61  2,22 
Chain  11,58  1,5 











Traditional  5,74  -0,79 
Chain  3,48  5,12 










Traditional  3,44  -4,83 
Chain  1,44  3,4 











Traditional  0,96  -4,94 
Chain  14,93  9,65 












Traditional  5,07  -5,58 
  
Region I – states of Bahia, Pernambuco, Sergipe, Alagoas, Paraíba, Rio 
Grande do Norte and Ceará, in Northeast region. 
Region  II – states of Minas Gerais, Espírito  Santo and Rio de  Janeiro 
(excluding the cities of Rio de Janeiro, Niterói, Nova Iquaçu, Duque de 
Caxias, Nilópolis, São Gonçalo and São João de Meriti). 
Region III – Greater Rio de Janeiro (cities of Rio de Janeiro, Niterói, Nova 
Iquaçu, Duque de Caxias, Nilópolis, São Gonçalo and São João de Meriti). 
Region IV – Greater São Paulo 
Region V – state of São Paulo, except Greater São Paulo 
Region  VI  –  states  of  Paraná,  Santa  Catarina  and  Rio  Grande  do  Sul 
(South region) 
Source: AC Nielsen Census 
 
III.  THE SURVIVAL OF SMALL RETAIL 
 
The  consequence  of  the  rapid  rise  of  efficient,  large 
supermarket  chains  was  supposed  to  be  market 
concentration and market power. Downstream consumers 
would face higher prices as a result of lower competition. 
Upstream suppliers would face the imposition of private 
standards and the buyer power, which would lower net 
margins. 
Empirical  evidences,  however,  do  not  support  the 
theory  of  disappearance  of  small  retail  due  to  the 
expansion of large supermarket chains. Farina, Nunes and 
Monteiro (2005a) offer an explanation for the survival of 
small  retail.  The  authors  call  attention  to  the  fact  that 
large supermarkets and small retailers offer their clients 
different  combinations  of  price  and  convenience  or 
purchasing costs. 
The food retail structure is described as an oligopoly 
with a competitive fringe.  Firms of the dominant nucleus 
(large supermarket chains) compete via prices according 
to  the  Bertrand  Model  and  differentiate  little  among 
themselves. The vast differentiation occurs between (a) 
the supermarket chains and (b) the traditional retail and 
the  independent  supermarkets  (competitive  fringe).  For 
each firm of the dominant nucleus, the demand is highly 
elastic to prices. 
By  assumption,  purchasing  costs  of  stores  of  the 
dominant  nucleus  are  higher  than  purchasing  costs  of 
stores  of  the  competitive  fringe.    In  general,  stores  of 
large  supermarket  chains  are  less  numerous  and  less 
spread  out  than  those  of  the  competitive  fringe.  
Furthermore, as long as stores of the dominant nucleus 
are larger, it is necessary to move greater distances within 
the store which implies more time spent when shopping.  
There are also long checkout lines at peak times. 
Firms  of  the  dominant  nucleus  have  difficulties  in 
raising  prices  and  extracting  a  higher  surplus  from 
consumers.  In the short term, competition among nucleus 
firms causes the strategy of sustaining high prices to be 
dominated  by  the  strategy  of  lowering  prices  provided 
that individual firms’ demands are highly elastic to prices.  
In  the  long  term,  growth  of  the  competitive  fringe 
challenges the attempt of nucleus firms to coordinate their 
price policies.  
Accordingly, consumers face a tradeoff between prices 
(lower in supermarkets and hypermarkets) and purchasing   4 
costs  (lower  in  traditional  retailers  and  independent 
supermarkets).  Because  consumers  have  distinct 
preferences  in  relation  to  price  and  convenience  –  and 
even a single consumer can choose different distribution 
channels in different circumstances – there is space in the 
market for traditional retailers and for independent self-
service  stores.  Small  food  retail  survives  in  spite  of 
having higher costs because it offers more convenience to 
the  consumer,  i.e.  involves  purchasing  costs  to  the 
consumer that are lower than that of the large chains. 
Once considering that the alternative of raising prices 
results  in  loss  of  market-share,  the  large  supermarket 
chains  seek  cost-reducing  innovations  whether  in  the 
process  of  controlling  merchandise  flows,  or  in  the 
negotiations with suppliers.  On condition that the other 
firms  of  the  nucleus  do  not  copy  the  innovation,  the 
pioneers can realize economic profit or reduce the prices 
to the consumer, winning market-shares from their direct 
competitors. 
To evaluate prices practiced in different retail stores, 
Monteiro  (2005)  analyzed  historic  price  series  for  the 
Municipal  district  of  Sao  Paulo,  Brazil.    The  price 
information  does  not  support  the  hypothesis  that 
supermarkets  manage  higher  prices  in  comparison  to 
traditional retailers.  Among the analyzed products, not a 
single case was found in which supermarkets set higher 
prices than traditional retail. 
 
IV.  DIFFERENTIATION IN FOOD RETAIL 
 
Farina, Nunes and Monteiro (2005a) consider only two 
groups of retailers:  supermarkets in the nucleus of the 
food  market  and  traditional  retail  in  the  fringe.  
Nevertheless, recent studies suggest relevant distinctions 
between  supermarket  chains  and  independent 
supermarkets (Dall’Agnese, 2007; Monteiro, 2007); and 
between  hypermarkets  and  supermarkets  (Monteiro, 
2007).  We  stress  here  some  issues  concerning  the 
complex differentiation in food retail. 
3 
Retail  stores  can  be  divided  into  four  categories: 
hypermarkets,  chain  supermarkets,  independent 
supermarkets and traditional retailers. Although there is a 
substantial  differentiation  within  the  groups,  one  may 
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ponder  that  differences  among  groups  are  more 
important. It is assumed that supermarkets offer the same 
variety of food products in comparison to hypermarkets. 
Hypermarkets, in contrast, also commercialize a wider set 
of durable goods (e.g. computers and TV sets). 
The  table  below  presents  some  basic  attributes  that 
characterize transactions between retailer and consumers. 
There are three intensity levels (high, average and low) 
for each attribute in each retailer category. 
 
Table 3: Attributes of transactions with final consumers in food 
retail 
 






Capillarity  Low  Medium - 
High 
High  High 
Product mix 
diversity 
High  High  Medium  Low 
Time spent in 
purchasing 
High  Medium  Medium  Low 
Payment 
easiness 
High  High  Medium  Low 
Customization 
of Product  
Low  Low  Low  High 
Impersonality  High  High  Medium  Low 
Purchasing 
environment 












Price  Low  Medium  Low  High 
Source: Farina, Nunes and Monteiro (2005b) 
 
Capillarity  means  the  presence  of  stores  in  the 
consumer’s neighborhood and its diffusion in the urban 
space. Product mix diversity is related to the number of 
products  and  brands  available  to  costumers.  Payment 
easiness  refers  to  the  acceptance  of  different  means  of 
payment besides cash (e.g. credit cards, debt cards, bank 
checks). Customization of product is the ability to shape 
products according to consumers’ will (size, colors, meat 
cuts).  Impersonality is negatively related to customer’s 
acquaintance  with  owners  or  stores’  employees.  The 
customer can, for example, believe that a clerk sales the 
best products to known, assiduous people and the worst 
ones  to  unknown,  sporadic  buyers.    Purchasing 
environment  includes  facilities  offered  to  customers,   5 
temperature  and light in the  store,  cleanliness,  displays 
and visual orientation. 
Competitive game in the food retail encompasses two 
stages. In the first stage, retailers decide where the stores 
of each kind will be located.  In the second stage, when 
number and characteristics of stores are given, retailers 
compete in price, services and the environment in which 
the consumer accomplishes the purchases.   
Big  chains  generally  include  hypermarkets, 
supermarkets and convenience stores. As a result, firms 
have  the  capacity  of  exploring  (i)  the  consumers’ 
propensity in paying for different attributes and (ii) the 
economies of scale and scope associated with centralized 
systems  of  distribution  and  purchase.  Hypermarkets 
present  smaller  marginal  costs  in  comparison  to  other 
kinds of store due to scale and scope economies, smaller 
level of convenience and factors related to urban location. 
Hypermarkets compete to each other generally via prices. 
Supermarkets,  on  the  other  hand,  are  located  in  urban 
areas  (neighborhoods)  and  offer  convenience  and  good 
environment. Supermarkets’ costs and prices are higher in 
comparison to hypermarkets’. 
Independent  supermarkets  are  also  located  in 
neighborhoods. Some costs are higher in comparison to 
chain supermarkets due to the absence of economies of 
scale, but other costs are smaller such as marketing costs.  
The traditional retail is the most heterogeneous type of 
store.  Average  costs  probably  are  larger  than  in  other 
formats. This kind of retailer presents the nearest store to 
the household. 
Supposing  two  or  more  hypermarkets  disputing 
consumers  in  one  given  area,  it  is  plausible  that  such 
firms establish a Bertrand's Game. In this case, price is 
equivalent to the marginal cost. On the other hand, chain 
supermarkets  are  price  makers  since  they  offer 
differentiated goods and additional services. Independent 
supermarkets follow the chain leaders, tying its prices to 
their rivals’. Traditional retailers behave as price takers in 
a price leadership model. 
Consumers  consider  the  net  utility  of  goods  (utility 
minus purchase costs) in each store. An individual whose 
preferences  present  usual  properties  (convexity, 
continuity, etc.) allocates his income in products of stores 
of distinct kinds. The consumer reaches the balance when 
the  marginal  utility  is  alike  in  each  retailer’s  category. 
Thus, different categories are compatible. 
Market  equilibrium  is  achieved  when  prices  in  each 
category reflect the differences in net utilities. Differences 
in prices for the same product can coexist, being efficient 
in  the  presence  of  heterogeneous  individuals. 
Consequently, the consumer behavior is important for the 
explanation  of  the  survival  of  convenience  stores  and 
independent  supermarkets.  However,  is  not  enough. 
Chains are able to reproduce some of the characteristics 
of small retailers while keeping cost advantages related to 
economies of scale and scope. 
 
V.  PRICE COMPETITION IN THE FOOD RETAIL 
 
A.  Hypermarkets and Supermarkets 
 
Let’s consider the analytical framework introduced in 
section  IV.  Specifically  consider  that  a  consumer  i  is 
interested in purchasing a bundle of food products and 
can choose between two equivalent bundles, the first sold 
exclusively in the hypermarket (H) and the other available 
just  in  the  supermarket  (S).  To  buy  in  each  store  the 
consumer  incurs  in  different  purchasing  costs:  H τ  
(purchasing cost in the hypermarket) and  S τ  (purchasing 
cost  in  the  supermarket).  Such  costs  are  constant, 
independent  of  the  quantity  purchased  and  different 
among consumers because of differences in the distances 
between the consumer’s residence and the stores and/or 
differences in the preferences. 
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j q → Φ τ : ,  0 '> Φ ,  is  a  function  that 
translates  purchasing  costs  into  equivalent  quantity  of 
goods,  i.e.  the  quantity  that  let  consumer  indifferent 
between H and S.  
Following  Farina,  Nunes  and  Monteiro  (2005a),  the 
consumer will be indifferent if the net utilities in the two 
stores are equal, i.e. if the difference in the quantity that 
can be purchased in the two stores compensates exactly   6 
the additional disutility corresponding to the difference in 
the purchasing costs. 
The model inspires some hypothesis: (i) if purchasing 




H ∀ = , τ τ , prices will be equivalent 
and the competition process will select the stores with the 
lowest  cost;  (ii)  if  stores  present  different  levels  of 
convenience,  prices  will  establish  a  stable  relationship 
which  expresses  the  difference  in  purchasing  costs 
perceived by consumers. 
We  analyze  empirical  evidences  through  a  database 
made  available  by  Fundação  Instituto  de  Pesquisas 
Econômicas  –  Foundation  Institute  of  Economic 
Researches  (FIPE).  The  Foundation  elaborates  the 
Consumer  Price  Index  (IPC-FIPE)  which  measures  the 
prices’ variation in the Municipal district of Sao Paulo, 
the Brazilian biggest city. 
Following Wen (2001), we consider that supermarkets 
do  not  simple  apply  a  markup  on  unitary  costs. 
Supermarkets  establish  its  prices  considering  both  the 
discrimination  opportunities  among  products  and  the 
competitor’s reaction regarding prices and quality levels.  
In  order  to  account  for  such  aspect,  we  performed 
calculations  of  price  indexes  for  a  bundle  of 
representative  products.  Each  product  in  the  bundle 
received a specific weight according to a Family Budget 
Survey (POF
4). The obtained prices express the value of a 
unity basket compose of products in the same proportion 
found in the whole sample of the Survey. 
The database encompasses 22 products 
5 whose prices 
where collected in 11 hypermarkets and 28 medium and 
large supermarkets’ stores. 
6 Each product, in each store, 
                                                 
4 ‘Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares’: Family Budget Survey 
for the Metropolitan Area of the State of Sao Paulo 
5 Sandwich cookie (weight 0,029), cream cracker (0,01), custard 
(001), tomato sauce (0,011), sugar (0,042), rice (0,127), wheat 
flour (0,009), beans (0,066), chuck (beef) (0,066), rump (beef) 
(0,059),  chicken  (0,127),  chocolate  milk  mix  (0,013),  coffee 
(0,07), milk UHT (0,129), butter (0,033), sliced bread (0,022), 
ham (0,011), mozzarella cheese (0,023), banana (0,05), potato 
(0,041), onion (0,02), tomato (0,032). 
6 Medium supermarket refers to a store with 8 to 20 check-outs; 
large supermarket refers to a store with 21 to 30 check-outs. 
is  characterized  by  a  price  series  that  extends  from 
January 2001 to March 2006. 
7  
The empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis 
that supermarket’s prices are higher than hypermarket’s 
prices  (graph  2).  The  data  also  indicates that  the  price 
difference is not constant (graph 3). The bundles’ average 
value is R$ 3.6 and the average price difference is just R$ 
0.06.  
If  retailers  are  differentiated  regarding  its  purchasing 
costs, the price difference in the long-run will be stable 
and  express  the  differences  in  consumers’  convenience 
perception.  On  the  other  hand,  if  purchasing  costs  are 
alike,  retailers  will  operate  in  a  competitive  market. 
Under  any  condition,  one  expects  the  price  series  to 
cointegrate. The existence of a cointegration vector would 
suggest a long-run relationship between the variables. A 
cointegration  vector  ] 1 ; 1 [ −   would  corroborate  the 
hypothesis of perfect competition between supermarkets 
and  hypermarkets;  other  types  of  cointegration  vectors 
would  express  the  value  that  consumers  attach  to  the 
different levels of  convenience  offered  by  the  different 
retailers.  
Yet, the performance of cointegration tests indicates that 
price series do not establish a long-run relationship. 
8 The 
absence of cointegration may suggest that hypermarkets 
and  supermarkets  compete  in  distinct  markets. 
Consumers  may  consider  the  shopping  experience  in 
supermarkets different from the shopping experience in 
hypermarkets. 
                                                 
7 Each product brand was considered distinctly in such a manner 
that  the  final  product  selection  implies  that  the  same  brands 
exist in all stores. This prevents that price differences among 
brands influence the analysis. The price series for a particular 
product represents the arithmetic mean of the brands. 
8  Both  series  are  non-stationary  according  to  Dichey-Pantula 
Test  and  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  Test  (see  appendix). 
Cointegration  tests  were  accomplished  through  the  Johansen 
Procedure. The test was performed considering a model without 
deterministic  terms  and  a  VAR  of  order  3.  For  the  null 
hypothesis of no cointegration, the Eigenvalue is 0.1196 which 
relates  to  a  trace  statistic  of  9.213.  The  critical  value  (5% 
significance) is 12.32.   7 







































Source: FIPE, elaborated by the authors 
 


































Source: FIPE, elaborated by the authors 
 
B.  Chain Supermarkets vs. Independent Firms 
 
We now center our attention on the price mechanism of 
chain supermarkets and independent firms. Independent 
firms are made of 4 or less supermarket stores under the 
same name (flag). The prices for chain supermarkets and 
independent  stores  are  shown  in  graph  4.  The  data 
originates  from  the  same  database  presented  in  the 
previous section. 
The  data  reveals  that  independent  supermarkets  set 
smaller  prices  during  the  whole  period. 
9  This  result 
                                                 
9 Cointegration analysis shows that price series do not establish 
a long-run equilibrium.   8 
comes as a puzzle. On the one hand, general belief reports 
that chain supermarkets set smaller prices in comparison 
to  independent  stores  due  to  larger  efficiency.  On  the 
other  hand,  considering  that  purchasing  costs  are 
equivalent between chain supermarkets and independent 
stores, the retailer that sets higher prices should disappear 
in  the  long  term  due  to  competition  pressure.  In  both 
cases  the  available  evidences  do  not  sustain  the 
conventional  thesis.  One  can  evoke  some  explanations 
that help us to comprehend these phenomena. We briefly 
discuss some potential explanations. 
 
 






































Source: FIPE, elaborated by the authors. 
 
Asymmetric information. Consumers may consider the 
accomplishment of an extensive price research too costly. 
As a result, firms have an incentive to set higher prices in 
comparison to its rivals because consumers ignore prices 
set  in  other  stores.  Alternatively,  consumers  may  be 
confused due to frequent price promotions. Calicchio et 
ally  (2007)  investigate  the  effects  of  supermarkets’ 
frequent price promotions on consumers’ price perception 
for a group of cities in Latin America. The authors find a 
negative  relationship  between  promotional  activity  and 
price  perception  accuracy.  They  also  verify  that  price 
perception  accuracy  is  considerably  smaller  in  the 
Municipal district of Sao Paulo in comparison to other 
Latin-American cities. 
Even supposing that asymmetric information add to the 
explanation of price differences, a question remains: why 
independent stores do not replicate the price strategy of 
chain  supermarkets  provided  that  consumers  face 
asymmetric information? 
Reputation.  Loertscher  and  Schneider  (2007) 
investigate  chain  stores’  incentives  of  charging  higher 
prices.  The  authors  assume  that  consumers  must  incur 
search  and  experimentation  costs  whenever  visiting  a 
store for the first time. If consumers change their location, 
they have to engage in new searches (i.e. incur in search 
costs) unless some firms from the previous location are 
also  present  in  the  new  location.  Search  costs  can  be 
mitigated  if  chain  stores  are  present  in  both  locations. 
Accordingly,  chain  stores  are  capable  of  setting  higher 
prices  in  comparison  to  independent  stores.  The  price 
difference derives from the differentiation in search costs. 
Tax evasion. Independent supermarkets may engage in 
tax evasion. Firms may understate revenues in order to 
get advantages of small business tax regimes. Employers 
may  whether  avoid  the  registration  of  some  of  his 
employees  or  register  employees  with  a  smaller  salary 
than that indeed paid so that less social contributions have 
to be paid. Tax evasion enables firms to set smaller prices 
because costs are reduced.   9 
Although this explanation may seem appealing, it is not 
absolute. Price differences cannot be entirely explained 
by means of tax evasion. According to D’Andrea et ally 
(2006)  “[C]omplete  evasion  of  these  taxes  is  unlikely 
even in countries with higher prevalence of “informality.” 
For  one,  large  companies  and  multi-national 
manufacturers  –  who  sell  formally  –  still  supply  the 
majority of consumer products in Latin America. When 
these  companies  sell  through  intermediaries,  tax 
compliance tends to “travel” along the value chain since 
middlemen have  strong  incentives to  also  sell formally 
and  recover  VAT  credits.  Moreover,  many  of  these 
companies  are  trying  to  sell  direct  to  small  retailers 
introducing  tax  formality  to  a  large  portion  of  small 
retailers’ sales. Secondly, in some countries, government 
agencies  are  improving  capabilities  and  small  retailers 
perceive a higher probability of being caught.” 
Cost  structure.  Chain  supermarkets  and  independent 
stores  differ  on  cost  structure.  Big  supermarket  chains 
engage  in  expensive  marketing  activities  and  operate 
distribution  centers.  Although  distribution  centers  are 
regarded  as  an important  competitive  advantage  due to 
economies  of  scale,  it  relates  to  construction  and 
operation  costs.  On  the  other  hand,  independent 
supermarkets  do  not  incur  in  costs  associated  with 
distribution  centers  and  its  marketing  expenses  are 
considerably  smaller  –  generally  restricted  to  local 
promotions. 
Vertical incentives. Chen (2003) offers an explanation 
to the survival of distinct retail formats. The objective of 
Chen’s  model  is  to  examine  the  countervailing  power 
hypothesis  using  a  theoretical  model  that  captures  the 
main ingredients of Galbraith (1952)’s arguments as well 
as some of the important features of the retail industry, 
mainly nonlinear contracts. Galbraith (1952) argued that 
countervailing power would be socially desirable because 
economic  power  on  one  side  of  the  market  begets 
countervailing power on the other side. 
Chen (2003) assumes a monopoly in the supplier sector 
and  a  dominant  firm  with  fringe  in  the  retail  industry. 
Retail  price  is  set  by  the  dominant  retailer,  while  the 
fringe  retailers  are  price-takers.  The  model  works  as 
follow:  A  rise  in  the  power  of  the  dominant  retailer 
reduces the share of joint profits accruing to the supplier. 
In an attempt to make up for lower profits earned from 
the dominant retailer, the supplier boosts sales to fringe 
retailers by lowering their wholesale price. The fall in the 
cost  of  fringe  retailers  shifts  their  supply  curve  to  the 
right, leading to a lower retail price. Therefore, the fall in 
retail price is the result not of a dominant retailer passing 
on cost savings to consumers but of a supplier trying to 
offset  the  reduction  in  profits  caused  by  the  rise  in 
countervailing power.  
Although Chen (2003) does not provide an explanation 
for  price  differences  in  the  retail  sector,  the  author 
uncovers  important  aspects  of  the  food  industry  which 
can be applied to the analysis of price strategy. 
In order to gain some insight regarding the competition 
between chain supermarkets and independent stores, we 
accomplish a simple econometric analysis. Our intent is 
not to formally test all arguments presented above. 
Based  on  the  assumption  that  competition  between 
neighborhood  supermarkets  is  locally  defined 
10,  we 
examine  disaggregated  data  associated  with  shops  in 
close  proximity.  Data  will  be  organized  as  a  pooling. 
Each cross-section unit represents a sub-area of a region 
(neighborhood). The equation to be estimated is: 
it i it it Z X dif ε π π + + = 2
'
1
' . .  
Where 
it dif  is the difference between the bundle’s price 
of a chain supermarket and of an independent store,  it X  
is a matrix of k regressores and  i Z  is a matrix containing 
a constant term and a set of specific variables for each 
unit  of  cross-section.  The  subscribers  i  and  t  refer 
respectively to location (neighborhood) and time. 
We treat  it dif  as independent cross-sections. Although 
this assumption is apparently strong, one should note that 
(i)  prices  set  by  chain  supermarkets  have  an  uniform 
component (which is common to all stores of the same 
flag) and a specific component (which is peculiar to the 
location  of  the  shop),  the  assumption  implies  that,  to 
some degree, the price’s specific component dominates 
the uniform component; (ii) we assume the independence 
of the price difference, not the independence of the prices.  
Data  used  in  the  estimation  is  equivalent  to  that 
presented  in  Graph  4.  There  are  only  two  differences. 
                                                 
10 Calicchio et al. (2007:52) state that: “Even including the few 
households  that  own  cars,  nearly  80  percent  of  Brazilians 
traveled less than 15 minutes on their most recent shopping trip 
— about one kilometer by foot or five kilometers by car. These 
habits mean that a retailer can hope to attract households only 
within a radius of two or so kilometers (applying a weighted 
average).”   10 
First, the degree of information aggregation: in Graph 4 
we analyzed the average price for several stores, now we 
examine prices for pairs of stores. Second, data extend 
from March 2002 to December 2006. Bundles were built 
on  a  strictly  analogous  manner  to  that  described  in 
subsection A.  
The availability of data coupled with the assumption of 
local competition reduced to five the number of districts 
analyzed. In each district only one chain supermarket and 
one independent store were studied. Table 4 indicates the 
analyzed  districts,  the  income  sextile  in  which  it  is 
classified and the distance between the chain supermarket 
and the independent store. For each store the value of the 
bundle was calculated. Subsequently, the price difference 
between the bundle of the chain supermarket and that of 
the  independent  supermarket  was  calculated  for  each 
district.  
 
Table 4: Districts – income sextile and distance (km) 
 
District  Income sextile 
Distance between the chain 
supermarket and the 
independent store (km) 
Carrão  3º sextile  1,1 
Casa verde  3º sextile  3 
Jaçanã  4º sextile  1,3 
Tremembé  3º sextile  0,7 
Vila Mariana  1º sextile  2,4 
 
The  model  estimation  involves  four  explanatory 
variables:  traveling  cost,  income,  buyer  power  and 
distance. Traveling cost is the real price for petrol (fuel) 
in Sao Paulo. Data were provided by FIPE. One should 
note  that  the  use  of  the  price  of  petrol  as  a  proxy  for 
traveling costs is not free from criticism. By using the 
average  price,  the  variations  in  price  between 
neighborhoods are not taken in account and it is implicitly 
assumed that the number of vehicles in each location is 
equivalent.  These  assumptions  are  particularly  strong 
when  considering  the  variability  of  income  among 
districts. Moreover, traveling costs are associated with the 
level  of  traffic  in  a  given  area.  This  feature  can  be 
partially captured by the specific effects of each unit of 
cross-section.  
The  variable  income  was  built  from  two  distinct 
sources:  the  Brazilian  Institute  of  Geography  and 
Statistics (IBGE) and SEADE Foundation.  It is a series 
of average wage per district.  
The  variable  buyer  power  refers  to  the  ratio  of  the 
Consumer  Price  Index  (CPI)  for  food  goods  and  the 
Wholesale Price Index for food goods. The ratio attempts 
to capture part of the buyer power exercised by the retail 
industry. This proxy variable is limited in several ways. 
The ratio is built without any consideration of time gaps 
between the rates, i.e. it is supposed that the impact of 
industry on retail is immediate. 
11 On the other hand, the 
relationship between industry’s market power and retail’s 
buyer power could be constant over the sample and the 
time.  
The  variable  distance  corresponds  to  the  distance 
between the chain supermarket and the independent store 
as reported in table 4. 
For  the  pooled  estimation,  we  consider  that  the 
conditional mean is a common function within the groups 
and analyze the heterogeneity in terms of differences in 
variances. The presence of heterocedasticity encourages 
the use of a generalized regression model (Generalized 
Least Squares - GLS), since the estimation by Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) generates biased estimators for the 
variance of the parameters. Specifically, we assume no 
correlation  between  time  periods  and  heterocedasticity 
between units of cross-section. Formally, 
( )
( ) t s j i t s j i X E
X E
i jt is
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An  additional  aspect  to  be  considered  relates  to  the 
inclusion of individual effects to the model. The lack of 
fixed  effects  in  a  model  may  produce  biased  and 
inconsistent  estimators  because  of  the  omission  of 
relevant variables.  
The results of the estimations are presented in Table 5. 
We  performed  four  estimations:  OLS,  OLS  employing 
White correction for the variance, Feasible GLS (FGLS) 
and Fixed Effects.  
The results suggest that variation in traveling cost plays 
a  significant  and  positive  effect  on  price  difference. 
Moreover,  the  term  of  interaction  between  changes  in 
traveling  costs  and  distance  presents  a  negative  and 
significant effect. Thus, for a sufficiently small distance,  
                                                 
11 When estimating the model using different gaps for the ratio, 
the results were not changed.   11 
Table 5: Estimation 
 
Dependent variable  Price difference  Observations per cross-section:  57   
Sample (adjusted)  04/2002 - 12/2006  Total observations  285    
(t-statistic)          
   OLS  OLS (White correction)  FGLS  Fixed Effects 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆(Traveling cost)  3,84  3,84  7,3  8,06 
   -0,825  -1,64  (2,25) *  (2,67) * 
          
Distance  0,048  0,048  0,067    
  (1,81) **  (1,84) **  (2,27) *    
          
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆(Traveling cost). Distance  -5,97  -5,97  -7,3  -7,54 
   (-3,00) *  (-3,85) *  (-3,60) *  (-3,83) * 
          
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆(Income)  -0,007  -0,007  -0,0007  -0,00072 
   (-0,776)  (-0,67)  (-0,92)  (-1,02) 
          
Buyer Power  -0,1  -0,1  -0,076  -0,089 
   (-0,525)  (-0,36)  (-0,46)  (-0,60) 
          
Constant  0,33  0,33  0,26    
   -1,36  -0,98  -1,26    
          
Const_Carrão        0,46 
         (2,55) * 
          
Const_Cverde        0,42 
         (2,25) * 
          
Const_Jaçanã        0,28 
         -1,57 
          
Const_Tremembe        0,26 
         -1,43 
          
Const_Vmariana        0,48 
           (2,63) * 
R²  0,0936  0,0936  0,142  0,329 
Standard error regression  0,2734  0,2734  0,2719  0,262 
Sum squared resids  20,8663  20,8663  20,6347  19,002 
F-statistic  5,7671  5,7671  9,2478  16,931 
P(F-statistic)  0  0  0  0 
* 5% significance 
** 10% significance   12 
the  difference  in  prices  rises  when  traveling  cost 
increases.  However,  from  a  given  distance  the  price 
difference tends to decrease. 
When interpreting the results, one should bear in mind 
the inherent limitations of database. The researchers do 
not know if there are other shops next to the analyzed 
supermarkets.  Since  competition  is  locally  defined,  the 
greater the  distance  between  two stores, the higher the 
probability of existence of other stores, which compete 
with the analyzed supermarkets. Accordingly, two distant 
supermarkets may face competition from other stores and 
it can generate incentives for the convergence in prices. 
Analyzing  the  same  issue  in  another  perspective,  we 
estimate  the  price  difference  only  as  a  function  of 
distance  (Table  5).  We  obtain  evidence  that  the  price 
difference is a quadratic function of distance. This result 
may be viewed in graph 5 which compares the average 
price difference and distance. 
12 
The  fixed  effects  attempt  to  capture  specific 
characteristics  to  each  cross-section.  The  estimation 
suggests that fixed effects are positive to all districts, i.e. 
intrinsic elements to each pair of stores have a positive 
effect on price difference. 
Table 5: Estimation – price difference as a function of distance 
 
Dependent variable: Price difference 
Sample (adjusted): 04/2002 - 12/2006 
Observations per unit of cross-section: 58 
Total observations: 290 
(t –statistic) 
 
distance  0,30 
  (14,90) * 
   
(distance)²  -0,085 
  (-8,16) * 
R²  0,1033 
Standard Error of regression   0,2824 
Sum squared resid  22,982 
F-statistic  33,21 
P(F-statistic)  0,00 
* 5% significance 
 
 
                                                 
12 It is worth noting that although the analysis identifies a given 
behavior of the difference in prices, it is unknown if price series 
are  actually  higher  in  comparison  to  the  level  that  would  be 
reached under conditions of perfect competition. 












































VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
Great part of the economic literature supposes that 
the fast growth of big supermarket chains is unavoidably 
associated with market concentration and market power. 
Supermarket  chains  increase  its  market  share  because 
there is a reduction in the number of other retail formats – 
especially  independent  supermarkets  and  traditional 
stores. The main proposition of this research is that the 
consequences of the concentration process in food retail 
are complex and can result in huge heterogeneity of retail 
formats.  
We  first  consider  that  hypermarkets  and 
supermarkets  compete  in  the  attraction  of  consumers. 
Evidences  for  the  municipal  district  of  Sao  Paulo, 
however, indicate that prices set by both types of stores 
do  not  establish  long  term  equilibrium.  This  result 
suggests that retail formats compete in distinct markets. 
Such  conclusion  may  perform  potential  impacts  on 
antitrust analysis. 
The  investigation  also  reveals  that  chain 
supermarkets  establish  higher  prices  in  comparison  to 
independent  stores.  This  result  comes  as  a  puzzle. 
Examining arguments that explain such price difference, 
we  conclude  that  there  is  not  a  single  factor  that 
contributes to its determination. When analyzing data for 
the  municipal  district  of  Sao  Paulo,  we  find  that  the 
distance  between  stores  may  play  an  important  role  in 
prices’ dynamic.   13 
In general, the analysis brings to light the complexity 
of competitive dynamics in food retail. Once the Brazilian 
retail  sector  is  characterized  as  an  oligopoly  with 
competitive  fringe  (where  the  nucleus  embodies  big 
chains and the fringe is represented by traditional retail 
and independent supermarkets), the analysis emphasizes 
the  heterogeneity  of  the  fringe:  while  traditional  retail 
establishes higher prices in comparison to that set by big 
chains,  independent  supermarkets  establish  smaller 
prices. Future research should explore this price diversity. 
Looking  for  a  more  comprehensive  view  of  retail 
competition,  future  research should  also investigate the 
price behavior of a wider set of products, which could 
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APPENDIX: Unit Root Tests 
 
   DICKEY – PANTULA     AUGMENTED DICKEY–FULLER 
Series  1st Stage  2nd Stage     Model  Lags¹  t-statistic 
  1° coeficient  2° coeficient      
HIPERMARKET  -5,06 *  -5,11 *  0,864    -  1  0,864 
SUPERMARKET  -4,43 *  -4,55 *  1,04    -  1  1,043 
 
* Rejection of Ho at the significance level of 5%. 
¹ Schwarz Criterion for a maximum of 11 lags. 
Dickey-Pantula Test 
1st Stage refers to t-statistic associated to coefficient β1 of the equation:  
t t t t e y y y + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ ∑ − − 1
2
1 1
2 . β ; et = white noise. 
In relation to 2nd Stage, 1st coefficient and 2nd coefficient refer, respectively, to t-statistics of coefficients α1 and α2 of the equation:  
t t t t t y y y y µ α α + ∆ + + ∆ = ∆ ∑ − − − 1
2
1 2 1 1
2 . . ; µt = white noise. 
 
 